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2.3.4 Airworthiness flight dispatch considerations
Although many of the airworthiness flight dispatch considerations may already be incorporated into approved programmes for other aeroplanes or non-extended diversion time operations, the nature of extended diversion time operations necessitates a re-examination of these programmes to ensure that they are adequate for this purpose. Systems redundancy levels appropriate to extended diversion time operations should be reflected in the master minimum equipment List (MMEL). An operator’s minimum equipment list (MEL) may be more restrictive than the MMEL considering the kind of extended diversion time operations proposed and equipment and service problems unique to the operator. Systems considered to have a fundamental influence on flight safety may include, but are not limited to:
a)  electrical, including battery;
b) hydraulic;
c)  pneumatic;
d) flight instrumentation;
e)  fuel;
f)  flight control;
g) ice protection;
h)  engine start and ignition;
i)  propulsion system instruments;
j)  navigation and communications;
k)  auxiliary power-units (APU); l) air conditioning and pressurization;
m) cargo fire suppression;
n) engine fire protection;
o) emergency equipment; and
p) any other equipment required for extended diversion time operations.
2.4 Continuing surveillance
2.4.1  The State of the Operator should monitor all aspects of the operation it has authorized to ensure that the level of reliability achieved in extended diversion time operations remains at the necessary level and that the operation continues to be conducted safely. In the event that an acceptable level of reliability is not maintained that significant adverse trends exist, or that significant deficiencies are detected in the design or the conduct of the operation, the State of the Operator should initiate a special evaluation, impose operational restrictions, if necessary, and stipulate corrective action for the operator to adopt to resolve the problems in a timely manner.
2.4.2 Causes of engine inflight shutdown, or other engine/propulsion system problems may be associated with design problems, and/or maintenance and operation procedures applied to the aeroplane. It is important to identify the root cause of events so that the appropriate corrective action is implemented. An operator should not be considered responsible for the occurrence of a design related event in its fleet. However, maintenance or operational problems may be wholly, or partially, the responsibility of the Operator. If an Operator has an unacceptable engine inflight shutdown rate attributed to maintenance or operational practices, then action tailored to that operator may be required by the State of the Operator. 
2.4.3 A high rate of engine inflight shutdowns for a small fleet, may be due to the limited number of engine operating hours and may not be indicative of an unacceptable rate. The underlying causes for such a jump in the rate will have to be considered by the State. 
2.4.4 The State of the Operator should alert the State of Design when a special evaluation is initiated and provide for its participation independent of the determined cause.
2.5 Maintenance requirements
2.5.1  Introduction
The operator’s maintenance programme should include the standards, guidance and direction necessary to support the intended extended diversion time operations. Maintenance personnel involved should be made aware of the special nature of extended diversion time operations and have the knowledge, skills and ability to accomplish the requirements of the programme.
2.5.2 Maintenance programme
2.5.2.1  The basic maintenance programme for the aircraft being considered for extended diversion time operations should be the continuing airworthiness maintenance programme currently approved for that operator, for the make and model airframe-engine combination. This programme should be reviewed to ensure that it provides an adequate basis for development of extended diversion time operations maintenance requirements. These should include maintenance procedures to preclude common cause human failures without proper verification processes or operational testing prior to extended diversion time operations. For two engine aeroplanes, the same person should not perform maintenance action on the same element of identical but separate maintenance significant systems during the same routine or non-routine visit. For aeroplanes with more than two engines, the same person should not perform maintenance action on the same element of identical but separate maintenance significant systems on two engines of a three engine aeroplane, or more than one engine per side of a four engine aeroplane during the same routine or non-routine visit. If such dual maintenance actions cannot be avoided, the State of the Operator may allow use of adequate ground tests, inspection procedures, a verification flight or other approved maintenance procedures to preclude common cause human failure modes.
　
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