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Airbus A321-211, G-SMTJ and Boeing 737-2E7, EI-CJI
2
Airport procedures
On the morning of 29 February 2004, Manchester Airport had been using 'Segregated Operations' on
both runways since 0645 hrs. This involved using Runway 06L for takeoff and Runway 06R for
landing. Each runway had a controller using a dedicated VHF frequency. The two controllers were
seated adjacent to each other in the Visual Control Room atop the 'Tower' and faced south towards the
runways; 'Air 1', on the left, was controlling Runway 06L and 'Air 2 was controlling Runway 06R.
Another controller, 'Ground Movement Control' (GMC) was seated at a desk behind them. 'GMC' had
responsibility for the control of aircraft between the parking stands and Runway 06L and used a third
discrete radio frequency. These controllers were part of a complete 'Watch' on duty in Air Traffic
Control. A map of Manchester Airport is included at Appendix 1.
Figure 1 Manchester Airport
Airbus A321-211, G-SMTJ and Boeing 737-2E7, EI-CJI
3
The normal procedures for departing aircraft involved taxiing under the control of 'GMC' and then
being transferred to 'Air 1' as they approached Runway 06L. Landing aircraft would be under the
Airbus A321-211, G-SMTJ and Boeing 737-2E7, EI-CJI
4
control of 'Air 2' until they vacated Runway 06R and then would be transferred to 'Air 1'. 'Air 1'
would co-ordinate and control aircraft crossing Runway 06L and then transfer them to 'GMC'.
'Air 1' and 'Air 2' each had a transmit and receive facility on both a dedicated VHF frequency and a
UHF ground vehicle movement channel. The two controllers conversed between each other by direct
speech, which is not recorded. In front of each, there was a Surface Movement Radar (SMR) display
and an Aerodrome Traffic Monitor (ATM)/ Approach Monitoring Aid (AMA) display. Each
dedicated display was adjusted to personal preferences by the individual controller. In the incident
involving G-SMTJ and EI-CJI, both SMR displays showed the ground movements of both aircraft
during the incident. One additional facility on the SMR was the incorporation of a Runway Incursion
Monitoring (RIM) system. This device was active on both SMR displays at the time of the incident.
In accordance with NATS (National Air Traffic Services) procedures, the controllers used a system of
Flight Progress Strips (FPS) to facilitate monitoring the movement of aircraft around the airport. A
FPS was dedicated to each aircraft and included all the necessary information relating to the
associated flight, including the callsign and the current clearance. For an outbound aircraft using
Runway 06L, the FPS was generated by Manchester ATC personnel and held by 'GMC' for
appropriate clearance and taxi instructions. As the aircraft approached the departure runway, 'GMC'
would transfer control of the aircraft to 'Air 1' and pass the FPS, via a 'chute', to the controller. After
takeoff, 'Air 1' would transfer control of the aircraft to the appropriate airborne agency and then
discard the FPS. For an inbound aircraft, the FPS was generated and passed to 'Air 2'. Once the
aircraft had landed and was clear of Runway 06R, the controller would transfer control of the aircraft
to 'Air 1' and hand over the FPS. Then, once 'Air 1' had controlled the aircraft across Runway 06L, he
would transfer control of the aircraft to 'GMC'. As an additional visual aid, the FPS holders would be
coloured blue for outbound aircraft and orange for inbound aircraft.
On the desk in front of 'Air 1', was a recess to receive the FPS. In the recess, 'Air 1' would insert a
runway designator strip ('Active Runway') with the active runway information. Above this strip
would be located those FPS associated with aircraft which had not been cleared to enter the runway.
As a procedure, the controller would clear an aircraft to enter the active runway and then move the
appropriate FPS to the bay below the 'Active Runway'. The size of this active bay was adjustable and
limited by a metal strip inserted by 'Air 1'. More than one FPS could be in that bay. For example, if
an aircraft was cleared for takeoff, the appropriate FPS would be positioned in the 'Active Runway
Bay' but if other aircraft had been given conditional line-up clearance or had been cleared to cross the
runway after a departing aircraft, additional FPS would be positioned there. The lowest positioned
FPS would be the aircraft with the highest priority using the basic principle of 'Bottom to Top'.
Manchester Airport's 'Manual of Air Traffic Services' (MATS) Part 2 procedure was that the
controller would move the FPS of aircraft cleared for takeoff or landing to the bottom of the bay
below the 'Active Runway'. MATS Part 2 also required that inbound traffic waiting to cross Runway
　
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