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The investigation examined three reports on previous dual sidestick input
occurrences involving Airbus fly-by-wire aircraft types. Those reports revealed that,
because neither crew member is provided tactile feedback of any sidestick inputs
made by the other, dual sidestick inputs are problematic.
On 21 June 1996, the crew of an Airbus A340 aircraft enroute from Dallas/Fort
Worth Airport to Houston Intercontinental Airport received a “descend” resolution
advisory from the aircraft traffic collision avoidance system. The copilot was the PF.
The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) factual report19 on the
incident revealed that:
The Captain initiated an immediate descent. The Captain did not make a verbal
announcement that he was taking command of the left side stick control.
In that incident, the dual inputs from the pilot in command’s and copilot’s side stick
controllers continued until the copilot noticed that the pilot in command was
providing sidestick input, and returned the right side stick controller to the neutral
position.
At the time of that occurrence, the ‘DUAL INPUT’ side stick warning system was
not available on A340 aircraft.
On 21 June 2000, an Airbus A321 aircraft was involved in a tailstrike accident
during a landing at London Heathrow. The copilot was the PF. The UK Air
Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) investigation report20 included information
that:
The aircraft touched down at an airspeed of 130 kt CAS, with a pitch attitude of
7.4° nose-up and a normal acceleration of 2.0g. The FO's sidestick position was
92.5% nose-up demand with an upelevator angle of 12.3°. The FO's sidestick
demand then reduced, towards 46.8% nose-up demand.
The ground spoilers deployed automatically; this is designed to occur when
both the main landing gear oleo switches are compressed. The FDR showed
that these switches then 'unmade' indicating that the aircraft had rebounded into
the air. The pitch attitude continued to increase to a maximum of 9.8° nose-up,
which was reached just as the aircraft mainwheels touched the ground again.
The tailscrape occurred at this point. The second touchdown recorded a normal
acceleration of 1.6g at which time the commander's sidestick moved forward to
a 56.3% nose-down demand.
The analysis section of the AAIB investigation included information that:
19 NTSB report FTW96LA269
20 AAIB Bulletin Ref: EW/C2000/6/8
– 18 –
The commander did not anticipate a problem until after the aircraft's initial
touchdown. He could not have been aware of the control inputs applied by the
FO21, in particular the continued aft sidestick input late in the landing, because
his own sidestick showed no movement.
and that:
The sidestick control authority logic requires a different method of intervention
by commanders from that which they may have experienced on other aircraft
types. Because of the difficulty of detecting the inputs made by the other pilot
early takeover of control based on flight characteristics is required.
On 9 October, 2000, another Airbus A321 aircraft was involved in another tailstrike
accident during a landing at London Heathrow. The copilot was the PF. The AAIB
investigation revealed that, during the latter stages of the landing approach, the pilot
in command became concerned at the high rate of descent. The pilot in command
then applied aft sidestick, which ‘progressed to nearly full aft sidestick by a height of
10 feet, in order to arrest the rate of descent but he did not activate his sidestick
takeover push button.’
The AAIB investigation report22 included a conclusion that:
As with other such incidents the commander could not see the control inputs of
the FO and his first indication was a high rate of descent at about 40 feet
shortly after the flare was initiated. He did not activate his sidestick takeover
button and, given the circumstances, this action would not have prevented the
tail of the aircraft contacting the runway. This occurred following the bounce
on the second touch down when the commander was using aft sidestick to
prevent the nose wheel coming down heavily.
Maximum demonstrated crosswind
The Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) published information regarding maximum
demonstrated crosswind in Briefing Note 8.6 of its Approach-and-Landing Accident
Reduction (ALAR) Toolkit.
The FSF reported that the information published in an aircraft’s flight manual and
operating handbook regarding maximum demonstrated crosswind related to the
maximum crosswind component encountered during the certification process of the
aircraft. The FSF also reported that the maximum demonstrated crosswind for a
　
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