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limits was required, because those limits were ‘for guidance only’
• whether crosswind limits should take into account runway surface conditions.
– 26 –
ANALYSIS
Introduction
Crosswind landings are routinely encountered in day-to-day flying operations. The
existence of a crosswind at a particular location will depend on the prevailing
meteorological conditions at that location. The level of risk posed by a crosswind to a
landing aircraft depends on the intensity of the crosswind and the existing risk
controls.
In ideal circumstances, those risk controls could include factors such as: an
operator’s standard operating procedures; a crew’s awareness of the prevailing wind
speed and direction, training and experience and aircraft handling technique; the
condition of the runway surface; and the prevailing ambient light and visibility.
This occurrence highlights that, even on a dry runway, when the prevailing weather
conditions result in a wind speed and direction that are within the maximum
demonstrated landing crosswind limits of an aircraft, compromises to the safety of
flight can occur if crews do not maintain their situational awareness about those
crosswind conditions. That situational awareness relies on crews seeking, being
provided with, and using all available information on the prevailing wind conditions
that may affect their aircraft during dynamic flight manoeuvres, such as the landing
flare, and on crews employing recommended aircraft handling procedures during
those manoeuvres.
Pre-existing conditions related to the operation of the
aircraft
Airworthiness
The maximum demonstrated landing crosswind limit (gust included) for the A340 of
37 kts was greater than that required under the certification requirements for that
aircraft. The aircraft was therefore capable of operating in crosswind conditions that
were greater than those specified in the relevant certification requirements.
There was no evidence that any pre-existing wear or deteriorated condition of the
number-1 tyre resulted in its failure during the landing sequence. Additionally, the
investigation identified no aircraft systems malfunctions that occurred during the
flight from Bangkok to Melbourne that may have contributed to the development of
the occurrence.
Flight crew
The flight crew were properly licensed and rated to operate the aircraft. The copilot’s
experience on the A340 was limited, however, before transferring to the A340, the
copilot had been a crew member on Airbus A330 aircraft. On that basis, the copilot
had previous handling experience on aircraft of similar size and handling
characteristics as the A340.
– 27 –
Both crew members were aware of the possibility of an engine ‘podstrike’ during
crosswind landings on the A340. The investigation was, however, unable to
determine how much previous operational experience either crew member had in
landing during similar gusting crosswind conditions as those experienced at the time
of the occurrence.
The crew’s decision to land on runway 16 at
Melbourne
The crew departed Bangkok with the knowledge that gusty northerly wind conditions
were expected at Melbourne between 0600 and 1100, and that a westerly wind of 15 kts
was expected after 1100. That information was contained in the Melbourne aerodrome
forecast that formed part of the crew pre-flight briefing.
The changed advice from the CANTY Sector Controller that the 23 kts crosswind
affecting runway 34, which had been acceptable for the crew’s planned landing on
that runway, had reduced to 9 kts resulted from an unintentional error by the acting
Flow Controller.
The subsequent offer by the CANTY Sector Controller of runway 16 as an
alternative to runway 34 on the basis that ‘…, there is 9 knots of crosswind on
runway 34…’, contributed to the crew’s decision to accept runway 16. That advice
by the controller was, however, illogical. As the reciprocal of runway 34, the
magnitude of the crosswind affecting runway 16 should have been expected by the
controller and crew to have equalled the 9 kts reported as affecting runway 34. In that
case, the crew’s initial plan to land on runway 34 would have remained operationally
acceptable to the crew.
The landing information contained in Melbourne automatic terminal information
service (ATIS) ‘Yankee’, including advice of the wind speed and direction at
Melbourne, should have indicated to the crew that tailwind conditions existed on
runway 34, and that gusting crosswind conditions existed on runway 16 (and runway
　
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