曝光臺(tái) 注意防騙 網(wǎng)曝天貓店富美金盛家居專營店坑蒙拐騙欺詐消費(fèi)者

Relatively few studies of China’s aerospace industry as a whole have been published in the past decade, but the rate of progress noted above has generally been consistent with past assessments. The 2001
For the definitive account of the changes in China’s defense industries during this period, see Cheung (2009), especially pp. 101–234. See also Mulvenon and Tyroler-Cooper, 2009.
RAND study stated that “China can expect to make significant tech-nological progress in coming years but cannot possibly catch up to, much less ‘leapfrog,’ the United States or Japan [in commercial tech-nology] in the foreseeable future” (Cliff, 2001, p. 58). Similarly, a 2005 RAND study that examined only China’s military aviation capabilities (Medeiros et al., 2005, p. 201) noted that
Progress in China’s military-aviation industry is mixed and limi-tations persist. There remain important gaps in China’s military-aviation R&D and production capabilities that will not soon be filled. . . . Any programs under way to fill these gaps are only in their very formative stages.
The study concluded (p. 203) that
The technological gap between China’s military-aviation industry and that of the most advanced countries will likely continue to close in coming years, [but] China will certainly continue to lag behind these countries.
Thus, China’s aerospace manufacturing capabilities in 2011 appear to be largely consistent with what would be expected based on the 2001 and 2005 RAND assessments.
Future Developments
It seems likely that over the coming decade China will begin produc-ing both a regional jet and a jetliner (the former being more certain than the latter). Whether these aircraft will be competitive outside of China, however, is less clear. Less of the ARJ21 will be made of com-posite materials than current Bombardier and Embraer aircraft, mean-ing that it will be heavier. In a market in which fuel efficiency is a key characteristic, it is not clear why airlines would choose to forgo brands with proven safety and reliability records to purchase an unproven and less-efficient aircraft. Nonetheless, it appears that China’s domestic airlines, encouraged by high tariffs for foreign-designed regional jets and possibly more direct pressure from the Chinese government, will purchase a certain number of ARJ21s, and some state-owned carriers in Third World countries may also purchase the ARJ21 in return for diplomatic or other considerations. Thus, COMAC may wind up sell-ing enough ARJ21s to, if not actually turn a profit, at least justify the investment in a learning process that will enable its next generation of regional jets to be commercially competitive outside of China. Within China, however, given the tariffs on foreign-designed regional jets and the relatively small size of the Chinese regional jet market, the ARJ21 is likely to dominate.
The story for the C919 is similar. The precise design of the air-craft has not yet been finalized, so how advanced it will be is unclear. However, its announced weight relative to its length and capacity sug-gests a design no more advanced than that of the 1980s-era A320. Moreover, initial deliveries are not expected before 2016, and Boeing and Airbus could easily develop and bring to market a more advanced narrow-body jetliner by then if the C919 appeared to threaten their market shares. Bombardier and Embraer are eyeing the narrow-body market as well, as are Russian and Japanese aviation manufacturers, so the narrow-body jetliner market in the coming decade is likely to be extremely competitive. Thus, the commercial success of the C919 is far from assured, even though China undoubtedly has the capabil-ity to manufacture an aircraft in this class. As with the ARJ21, Chi-na’s domestic airlines will purchase a certain number of airframes but, unlike the case of the ARJ21, the majority of narrow-body jetliners sold in China could well be foreign-made, even after the C919 comes to market. And until China develops a wide-body jetliner, all such jetlin-ers sold in China will be foreign-made. Again, as with the ARJ21, how-ever, the C919 program may ultimately be valued not for the profits it produces but for the learning experience it provides, enabling China to acquire the skills needed to develop a commercially competitive air-craft in the future.
　
中國航空網(wǎng) m.k6050.com
航空翻譯 www.aviation.cn
本文鏈接地址：Ready for Takeoff China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry(74)