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operational impact.
UA SURVIVABILITY IN COMBAT
UA have been used in combat since 1944 when the TDR-1 assault drone, guided by a pilot in the loop
using television, was used to drop bombs on Japanese positions in the Pacific. Its operating unit lost three
out of 50 aircraft during its two months of service due to hostile fire. Later, during the Vietnam War, the
AQM-34 was used to collect reconnaissance data. Limited data from 1964-1989 show UA combat loss
rates of 3.9/year during the Vietnam conflict (1964-69), 4.5/year in the Bekka Valley conflict (1981-82)
and 1/year over the period of the Angolan Border War (1983-87).
A more complete data set, including non-combat losses, is available for the period of 1991-2003, which
covers the major conflicts Desert Storm (1991), Allied Force (1999) and OEF and OIF (2001-2003).
Over that 13-year period 185 UA losses were recorded, an average of 14.2 per year. Considering the
specific periods of major conflict; 20 RQ-2 Pioneer UA were lost in Desert Storm over a period of less
than a year, 18 were combat losses and two were non-combat losses. In Operation Allied Force in
Kosovo, 45 UA of various types were lost. Of the 45 losses, 26 were combat and 19 were non-combat.
Data available from OEF and OIF over the period of 2001-2003 show a substantial decrease in UA loss
rates, with an average of 2.0 combat losses and 2.7 non-combat losses per year over the three-year period.
The threats encountered by UA since the 1960s have evolved over time. In the Vietnam War, the
principal threat to the A/BQM-34 was Soviet MiG fighter aircraft. In the 1980s conflicts in Syria and
Angola, the Soviet SA-3, -6, and -8 surface-to-air missiles were the principal threat. While in more recent
conflicts combat UA losses have been attributed primarily to small arms, air defense artillery, and
unspecified ground fire. Any number of tactical, strategic, technological, and political factors will
continue to affect the threats UA face in the future.
In addition to lethal threats, there exist non-lethal threats based in electronic warfare or information
warfare techniques. Both active and passive techniques can degrade or deny the ability of a UA to fulfill
its intended mission. UA systems are susceptible to hostile actions against their electronic systems and
subsystems, communications data links, GPS systems, and their command and control data links. These
hostile actions can be active, as in the case of jamming, meaconing, or deception, or passive, as in the
UAS ROADMAP 2005
APPENDIX K – SURVIVABILITY
Page K-2
case of interception and exploitation of the data collected by the UA. All classes of UA are susceptible to
non-lethal threats.
While UA have been used in combat since the Vietnam War, combat and non-combat loss data is notably
sparse. With the proliferation of militarized UA in the last decade it is likely that a significant portion of
the information about UA combat experience is widely dispersed and undocumented. In addition, the
limited data that is readily available does not provide insight on subsystem/damage mode contribution to
combat loss or characterize the damage inflicted on UA that have returned from combat missions. Data
of this type regarding combat damage to manned aircraft since Vietnam have proven invaluable in
understanding the vulnerability of the aircraft and mitigating the threat. The systematic collection of
equivalent data for unmanned aircraft would be of equal benefit.
SURVIVABILITY AS A SYSTEMS DESIGN DISCIPLINE
DoD systems are intended to accomplish their mission in “a man-made hostile threat environment.” In
order to be mission effective, survivability must be considered; survivability becomes one of the design
factors in achieving the most mission effective system at the lowest cost.
Is it less costly to procure many inexpensive expendable UA, a few more expensive attritable UA, or even
fewer more expensive but more survivable UA? For manned systems, loss of human life is a
consideration that pushes the systems to a higher level of survivability. For unmanned systems this is not
the case. However, DoD UA still need to be effective and able to accomplish their missions in hostile
environments. To achieve that, survivability must be part of the design process. The extent that
survivability will be included in a design is dependant on many factors including the mission(s) to be
accomplished, the criticality of those mission(s), the threat environment that will be encountered, and the
number of assets available taking into account the UA aircraft as well as the payload. To perform a noncritical
mission in a low threat environment other aspects of the design (e.g., cost, range, or payload) will
take precedence over survivability features. This may also be true if a large number of expendable assets
　
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