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the A-310, may have influenced the outcome of the flight significantly.
During pre-flight preparation the crew received full meteorological
support for the take-off airport, the flight route, the destination airport of Irkutsk
and the diversion airport of Bratsk. The forecasted and actual weather did not
hinder the decision to take off according to version 3 "Duration of flight to
destination airport calculated at more than 5 hours" of Table 1, clause 5.5.11.1
of CAFOM-85, given the presence of the diversion airport at Bratsk.
During the pre-flight preparation the crew was given a provisional
estimate of the flight, which estimated the duration of flight to Irkutsk at 5 hours
25 minutes, and a fuel load of 33,110 kg. Based on an analysis of the
meteorological conditions, the Captain decided to increase the fuel load to
37,200 kg.
At the end of the pre-flight preparation, the airplane captain took the
justified decision to fly.
Final Report
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AVIATION COMMITTEE
92
During the pre-start preparation there were no deviations from the
established requirements discovered on the basis of the available information.
On board the airplane were 195 passengers (of these 2 were service
personnel), 2 flight crew members and 6 cabin crew members (flight
attendants).
Take-off from Domodedovo was at 17:17 from runway 32 (right) in the
following configuration: slats/flaps - 15/15 degrees, stabilizer set at position
+1.4 degrees, with engines at "flexible" mode.
Take-off, climb and the flight along the route occurred without
deviations. Auto-pilot no. 1 was used during the flight (auto-pilot no. 2 was not
used because of its malfunction).
Note: According to technical records, the defect of autopilot
no. 2 was discovered on June 23, 2006.
Replacement of the rudder servo did not eliminate the
defect, which was discovered again on July 4, 2006. The
defect was entered in the list of deferred malfunctions
with a rectification deadline, in accordance with the
MEL, of no later than July 14, 2006. During a prior
flight on the same airplane (Irkutsk - Moscow),
according to his report, the Captain, deactivated autopilot
no. 1 after take-off because of a malfunction. The
entire flight was carried out in manual mode. The defect
was not confirmed during maintenance done at
Domodedovo on July 7, 2006. There were no failures of
auto-pilot no. 1 recorded during the last flight.
Initially, at 17:32 the airplane was taken to 8,100 m. During the flight and
as the flying weight decreased, the crew occupied higher altitudes of up to
11,100 m.
At cruising altitude the crew used the AFS "profile speed" mode during
horizontal flight. Once it hit a zone of turbulence at 21:54, the crew activated
control mode M for 4 minutes.
Before entering the Irkutsk ATC area, the crew obtained Lima ATIS
information for 22:00 on the weather conditions at the airport: "surface wind -
280 degrees 4 m/s, visibility 3500, weak showers, complete cumulonimbus
clouds 170, temperature +11, pressure 707 mmhg or 943 gPa. Condition of
runway: wet, 100%, 2 mm, friction 0.5".
For the airplane's landing weight of ~114,000 kg, the calculated required
landing distance on a wet runway using automatic wheel braking in LOW mode
and without using the engines’ thrust reversers is 1,850 m (FCOM 2.15.30). The
landing distance available on runway 30, given the shifted entry threshold, was
2,425 m. Therefore, the landing weight and calculated landing center-of-gravity
of the airplane (29.8% САХ) did not exceed the established limitations of the
assumed landing conditions.
Final Report
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AVIATION COMMITTEE
93
Note: The required landing distance for the actual
landing weight, with the automatic brake system in LOW
mode, without using the thrust reverser on the right
engine and for a runway "covered with water" (depth up
to 6.3mm), was 2000 meters. Use of the thrust reverser
on the right engine reduced the required landing
distance by 75 meters for a runway condition of "wet"
and by 125 meters for a runway "covered with water".
The following radio equipment for landing approach was operational at the
airport with a landing heading of 295º: outer and middle markers, VOR+DME
beacon, localizer beacon of the ILS 295 system (the glidepath beacon was taken
out of service because of the offset of the runway threshold, about which there is
a corresponding NOTAM). A control radar was used to monitor the trajectory of
the airplane’s movements.
Given the above-mentioned list of conditions, the Captain chose the landing
　
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