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of this report to determine blame or liability but solely to
identify causes and deficiencies capable of undermining
flight safety and to gather information for preventing further
occurrences of similar circumstances.
Following ICAO Recommendation, Chapter 6 §6.7 (Note), this report
has been prepared in English.
Technical Report nr 16/INCID/04
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SYNOPSIS
On 14th June 2004 at 16:08 UTC, the Airbus A321-231, marks G-OZBE, departed
London (Gatwick), with 2/7 crew and 33 passengers on board and made an uneventful
transit to Faro Airport.
The first officer was the pilot flying (PF) throughout the flight.
Flight conditions were VMC, wind surface 280º at 10 kt. When the aircraft was
fully stabilized with fully flaps for landing, the autopilot was disconnected. The
autothrust was left engaged. The touchdown was smooth, the spoilers deployed and
the pitch attitude started to reduce but then the nose reared up quickly upon sidestick
nose-up demand. In spite the commander took over the aircraft control and put
the stick forward to reduce the pitch attitude, the aircraft tail struck the runway.
The landing time was 18:18 hours UTC.
The aircraft had suffered tail structural damage. There were no personal injuries.
Technical Report nr 16/INCID/04
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1. FACTUAL INFORMATION
1.1 History of the flight
The Airbus A321-231, marks G-OZBE, departed London (Gatwick), on 14th June
2004 at 16:081, with 2/7 crew and 33 passengers on board and made an uneventful
transit to Faro Airport.
This was a line training flight, being the 27th sector for a new first officer. The
first officer was the pilot flying (PF) throughout the flight.
i. Initial Approach
The crew carried out a briefing, before the top of descent point, for an ILS R28
approach and manual landing at Faro. Autobrake medium was selected. Prior to
descent ATC requested that the aircraft reduce to minimum speed for traffic spacing.
Accordingly, Mach 0.74/250 kt was entered for the descent speed in the
FMGC. The aircraft was initially given clearance to position to 20 nm final approach
Runway 28 and then re-cleared to 7 nm final.
ii. Final Approach
Flaps 1 was selected prior to intercepting the localiser course and, when established
inbound, flaps 2 was selected. Flight conditions were VMC with the sun
low on the horizon beyond the runway. The approach continued and when the aircraft
was fully stabilised with full flaps the autopilot was disconnected. Autothrust
remained engaged and flight directors were on. The aircraft was slightly high on
the glide slope at some point but, by 200 feet AGL, the PAPIS indicated on the
correct approach path.
iii. Touchdown (at 18:18 hours)
At 50 feet AGL the descent rate was checked, (reduced) at 30 feet the thrust levers
were closed and a landing flare carried out. A 5 feet RA callout was heard followed
by a smooth touchdown. The spoilers deployed and the pitch attitude
started to reduce but then the nose reared up quickly. The commander called out
1 All times referred in this report are UTC hours.
Technical Report nr 16/INCID/04
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"I HAVE CONTROL" (he cannot recollect whether he used the side-stick takeover
push button) and put the stick forward to reduce the pitch attitude. He lowered
the nose to the runway and completed the landing roll vacating the runway at
the second to last turnoff.
iv. Post Landing
During the taxi to stand the crew was alerted to the possibility of a tailstrike having
occurred by ATC. Neither the pilots or the cabin crew had heard any significant
noise on touchdown although one passenger made a comment "WHAT WAS
THAT?" and one of the rear crew members had felt a movement of the floor beneath
her feet.
Following shutdown and disembarkation of the passengers the commander inspected
the aircraft and discovered the damage.
1.2 Injuries to persons
1.3 Damage to the aircraft
Engineering Report
Examination of the aircraft at Faro
Airport showed damage to the lower
fuselage. The visual inspection carried
out by maintenance revealed an
extension of 2 meters, approximately,
of exterior skin paint abrasion
under the tail section.
INJURIES CREW PASSENGERS OTHERS
FATAL - - -
SERIOUS - - -
MINOR - - -
NONE 2+7 333
Figure 1 – Tail strike area.
Technical Report nr 16/INCID/04
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The lower skin was abraded from Frame 63 to around Frame 67 between Stringer
42 L/H and Stringer 42 R/H.
Within this area of abrasion, it seems there were no structural damages from the
　
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