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the warning was displayed at around 9:22 h when the inhibition ended.
However, the flight crew had not recorded any complaint or squawk in the flight logbook,
neither the residual pressure appearance, nor the deviation during the landing
roll, nor the high brake temperature.
The ground personnel took action to determine the origin of residual pressure, but did
not write anything in the logbook. The maintenance procedures indicate that if the
ground personnel detect any malfunction, they must write it down even when not previously
reported by the flight crew.
Afterwards, the data gathered suggest that while the line maintenance personnel was
trying to contact another department of the operator to seek support information to
treat the problem of residual pressure, the boarding of the passengers started for the
flight back to Madrid. This fact probably produced additional stress regarding the
need to dispatch the aircraft as soon as possible. Anyway, given the facts that the
residual pressure had disappeared and that the support personnel in Barajas could not
Technical report IN-062/2002
40
be contacted, the «transit check performed» box of the logbook was completed and,
since there was not any complaint recorded in the logbook, theoretically there was
also nothing to correct, and the doors were closed and the pilot in command decided
to initiate the flight, with the understanding, according to his statement, that the aircraft
was released to service. After the boarding, contact with maintenance people in
Madrid was finally achieved, and the situation was commented but no further maintenance
action was carried out. The maintenance personnel gave additional instructions
to the crew, which in turn had decided that if during taxi any malfunction of the
brake systems was noted, they would return to the parking area for additional maintenance
action.
The captain did not complete the box «Captain Acceptance» («aircraft acceptance by
the captain») of the next page of the logbook that pertained to the flight of the incident.
It is considered that it is possible that some doubts or misunderstandings existed regarding
who had ultimate responsibility over the aircraft at every moment, but it would
have been necessary to make additional efforts to understand with detail the causes and
possible effects of the residual pressure in the brake system. The BSCU test was initiated
but not completed. Therefore, the intended maintenance actions were not finished.
In this case, the facts that the aircraft veered to the left and very high temperatures
were achieved, including smoke coming out from the wheels, should have been sufficient
to remove any doubt about the spurious nature of the fault. It should have been
clear that the residual pressure had been real during the landing and therefore more
troubleshooting was needed.
When the aircraft started taxiing again, the «RESIDUAL BRAKING» caution had disappeared
and the crew did not report problems with the controllability of the aircraft
during the taxi towards the runway and takeoff.
2.3. Operation during the flight Tenerife Norte-Madrid-Barajas
After the doors were closed and the taxi started, the crew came to the conclusion that
the brake system was functioning normally, and proceeded with the takeoff. The landing
gear was left down for some time to cool the brakes that still had a slightly high
temperature. During the return flight to Madrid, the crew had at least two hours to
study the actions to be taken in the event the residual pressure reproduced during the
descent.
The DFDR data show that the pages of the ECAM were not displayed to check the status
of several systems, as required by the Operations Manual (2.01.52, 15-09-200,
«Watch the evolution of the parameters of the engine and aircraft systems though the
ECAM, regularly calling the different pages...»).
41
Technical report IN-062/2002
During the descent to Madrid, the residual pressure in the left side of the alternate
system had started to increase progressively when the aircraft was at 13000 ft.
At 12:58:02 h, the page WHEEL of the ECAM was deployed and the crew detected that
pressure, because they saw in amber colour the 24 bars representing the left brakes.
The reaction of the crew was to reset the BSCU, moving to OFF and then to ON the
switch ANTI SKD & N/W STRG, but the amber bars did not disappear.
Faced with this situation, the crew expressed their concern, because the preceding landing
in Tenerife, where the deviation had been considered to be caused by the malfunction
of some component of the brake system during the landing roll.
The residual pressure continued increasing and 500 psi were reached at the moment in
　
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