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■ After departure...to avoid an inadvertent cloud encounter
and potential ice, I proceeded to 17,500 feet. About one
minute later, the right engine began to miss and the EGT
gauge dropped all the way down. The cylinder head
temperature on the left engine dropped abruptly, as did the
[temperature] on the right engine. Both engines were running
rough. There was no change in manifold air pressure, RPM
or other engine instruments. [We made a long, slow descent
to a nearby airport]. At 6,000 feet, both cylinder head
temperatures came up and the engines smoothed out.
After some investigation back on solid ground, our reporter
found small amounts of water in the sump and concluded:
My assumption is that the super-cooled fuel created ice
crystals, which, when ingested by the engine, caused the
roughness.
Spring Fever
A holdover from springtime is hay fever, allergies, and sinus
problems. Some pilots are affected all year long, their afflictions
causing conflictions, as this First Officer reports:
■ We were descending in holding to FL220. The Captain
(not flying) was clearing a sinus block. I was cleared lower, I
thought to FL190. The Captain did not hear the clearance,
but saw me set FL190 in the altitude reminder and he read
back the clearance to FL190. ATC responded that we were
only cleared to FL200 and turned us behind [conflicting]
traffic without incident.
A contributing factor was the ear block, [which] made it
difficult for the Captain to hear and repeatedly distracted
him as he tried to clear it.
A passenger’s allergies can also make life exciting for the
pilot.
■ During descent, my wife began having an allergy attack
and requested her medicine from the rear seat. As I turned to
reach for the medicine, I inadvertently disconnected the autopilot.
I reactivated it, [but] in my haste to help my wife, I
neglected to reactivate the descent altitude warning system. I
was subconsciously relying on the altitude warning system to
advise me of my assigned lower altitude. The Center Controller
then said he showed me 700 feet below my assigned altitude.
I immediately corrected altitude and was then handed
off to Approach. Lesson learned: Even when flying in the
company of a distraught and medically needy wife, the pilot
must always first fly the airplane.
Or as an anonymous ASRS staffer noted, “better to receive
the nagging of a spouse than the snagging of an aircraft by
Mother Earth.”
Frequency "blind spots" at an ATC transmitter/receiver site
Multiple incidents of Airbus 320 false engine fire warnings
Concerns over a new FAA flow control program (MAPS)
A non-standard rotating beacon at a Minnesota airport
An uncharted flight restriction area in the Southwest
ASRS Recently Issued Alerts On... A Monthly Safety Bulletin
from
The Office of the NASA
Aviation Safety Reporting
System,
P.O. Box 189,
Moffett Field, CA
94035-0189
TOTAL 3055
Cabin/Mechanics/Military/Other 20
Controllers 64
General Aviation Pilots 848
Air Carrier Pilots 2123
March 1995 Report Intake
MEL-ancholy Miscellany
“If you want it done right, do it yourself,” common wisdom
goes. Actually, doing it yourself usually is not necessary if
the flight crew and ground crew coordinate their efforts and
follow company policies regarding MELs (Minimum
Equipment Lists). In this ASRS report from a Part 135
commuter First Officer, a breakdown in communication
opened the door–or rather the cowling–to a mishap that
could have had much more serious consequences.
■ Our crew arrived late... The PIC was briefed on three
open maintenance items, and departed to speak with
dispatch. I completed an exterior safety inspection at the
same time maintenance personnel began work on the
outstanding items. [We] were briefed that the first two items
were completed and signed off, and the third item was to be
deferred as per the MEL. At no time was the crew informed
that a cowling had been opened in order to look at the third
maintenance item, and then been closed.
Climbing through 2000 feet...a passenger noticed the #2
nacelle cowling had blown open.
Perhaps the greatest contributing factor was the failure in
communication between maintenance and the crew.
[Usually] a second quality assurance checker inspects and
then signs off the work. This does not appear to have
happened in this instance. Perhaps, too, the crew’s eagerness
to complete their trip was a contributing factor. Presently,
company policy is being reviewed to prevent this from
　
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