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replaced or resealed before departure from XYZ.
I have since created for myself a “diversion checklist” to
help me to remember what I need to [do] should I have a
diversion again in the future.
If the crew had filled out the aircraft logbook with a
notation regarding the emergency items, the Emergency
Medical Kit and portable oxygen bottles might have been
replenished at the diversion location before the flight
continued. This reporter’s company and others might
also consider implementing a procedure for company
dispatchers to follow when an aircraft diverts for a
medical emergency. In the meantime, the reporter’s idea
of a diversion checklist is a good one.
A Case of Cursed Cuisine
A First Officer’s experience with inflight illness
underscores the wisdom of policies in place at many
airlines that prohibit flight crews from eating the same
meals during a flight or on layovers.
n  First Officer (me) had earlier noticed an upset stomach
which he thought due to an 8-hour-previous spicy lunch he
had eaten. Took antacids and symptoms went away.
Takeoff and climb were normal. Approximately 30
minutes into cruise upset stomach returned with nausea.
First Officer went on 100% oxygen and that helped
temporarily. A few minutes later, acute nausea and
intense digestive discomfort manifested themselves. A
doctor was summoned and her diagnosis was onset of the
flu or other virus. At that point the First Officer [got sick]…
The Captain and dispatch elected to have us divert to XYZ
for a new First Officer. During the flight, the Captain
handled the radios most of the time…I did PNF duties
such as checklists and sometimes ATC/radio
communications. No emergency was declared, although
the Captain did ask for priority [handling]. After a night
in the hotel I had no more nausea, but did have general
flu-like symptoms…
I consulted my physician [later]. He diagnosed it as food
poisoning, and after a comprehensive exam said I was well
and could return to flying. Let this be a warning to crews,
especially single-pilot crews, about the severity and
suddenness [with which] food poisoning or a virus can
strike.
We hope that all flight crews will take our reporter’s
warning to heart, along with the additional thought that
special precautions against food poisoning need to be
taken by those flying overwater routes. Ill crew members
cannot easily be replaced once an aircraft is mid-Pacific or
mid-Atlantic.
Going for
the Green
An air carrier Captain prefaces his report of a runway
incursion by noting, “Follow the Yellow Brick Road—
or in this case, the inlaid green taxi centerline
lights—and you may not get to the Emerald City, or to
the correct runway either.”
n  I called for a taxi clearance, and was told to taxi to
Runway 9—no via this or that taxiway. There was a
runway parallel to our track and a somewhat
reassuring string of green lights passing under the
nose and strung out up ahead. Only trouble was, they
didn’t lead to Runway 9. As I approached an
intersecting runway (12/30), the co-pilot questioned
our taxi route. Prior to his comment, I was thinking
all was just fine. I didn’t want to slam on the brakes,
and by the time I realized that he was right, we were
across Runway 12/30. Fortunately the runway was
closed.
I’ve been to this airport dozens of times before. The
difference between going the right way and the wrong
way amounted to allowing myself to follow a few green
lights and not being more vigilant in checking the taxi
route. I should have stopped the aircraft at the first
hint of confusion.
The reporter fell into two traps—assuming that his
aircraft was intended to follow the green taxi
centerline lights, and that they would lead him to the
desired runway. In this instance, one or both of these
assumptions turned out to be incorrect. The First
Officer’s concern about the taxi route should have
been a heads-up to the crew to contact Ground
Control for clarification.
A Monthly Safety Bulletin
from
The Office of the NASA
Aviation Safety Reporting
System,
P.O. Box 189,
Moffett Field, CA
94035-0189
January 1999 Report Intake
Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots 2035
General Aviation Pilots 523
Controllers 57
Cabin/Mechanics/Military/Other 178
TOTAL 2793
ASRS Recently Issued Alerts On...
http://olias.arc.nasa.gov/asrs
Number 237 March 1999
Runway visibility obstruction at a Minnesota airport
　
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