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While reviewing aircraft log book, noted discrepancies
with Item #54, an interim repair. Inspected First Officer
clear view window and noted toilet paper had been used
with sealant around half the First Officer window. This is
the interim repair and deferral for follow-up maintenance.
ASRS’s resident maintenance guru tells us there are
several approved methods in the maintenance manual for
interim repair of cockpit window pressure leaks. None
include toilet paper in the materials required.
Caps Off
A study of return-land incidents to be published later this
fall in ASRS’s Directline publication found that more than
one third of the study incidents involved pre-departure
errors by ground personnel and flight crews, or pre-existing
equipment problems. The next maintenance report
highlights a typical cause of a return-land event:

I was servicing all three engines and serviced #1 last as it
was the last one shut down… I was thinking about returning
the oxygen cart that was needed for servicing the aircraft.
Because I was distracted by that thought, I forgot to secure
the oil cap. Because the door on the cowl was down, I
thought I had capped the tank and secured the door. I then
returned the oxygen cart with the flatbed. Six minutes later
the next aircraft came into the gate. Approximately 15
minutes later I went to service all engines on that aircraft. I
then saw the oil cap and contacted the lead [mechanic], who
contacted Maintenance Control.
Hitchhiking Spacers
ASRS has recently received a
rash of maintenance reports
describing technicians’ failures
to install spacers (a type of
washer) when changing wheel
assemblies. The absence of this
small part causes excessive bearing
wear and tire “wobble.” In some of these
incidents it appears that the spacers themselves are
hitchhikers–in grease:

During inspection found right nose tire worn to limits.
While removing wheel assembly from axle, spacer or washer
that fits between axle nut and outer wheel bearing ‘stuck to’
removed wheel assembly. The rebuilt wheel assembly was
installed without spacer. The removed wheel assembly was
rolled to stores shipping area, then trucked to wheel shop
where it [spacer] was discovered still affixed to the bearing.
Line maintenance was notified and aircraft was taken out of
service to reinstall this part.
Contributing factors to this situation may be the type of
grease (adhesiveness) which had been changed a while ago
and/or the grease seal which grips and forms a tight seal
around the edge of the spacer.
Use of work cards, which provide step-by-step instructions
for routine parts installations, can help technicians detect
when spacers have gone AWOL.
When CFIs Fly Together
This excellent report from a CFI involved in a lossof-
separation incident at an uncontrolled field
describes some of the crew coordination issues at
stake–and potential hazards–when two CFIs fly
together.

This was a training flight where I, the pilot flying,
was getting checked out in a new aircraft…by
another CFI. While I was doing the flying, the pilot
not flying was handling all the electronics. We were
both looking out for other traffic and making radio
calls.
Unable to get a response from UNICOM we decided
to land on Runway 22… On taxi back there was a
fair amount of chatter on the UNICOM and the pilot
not flying turned the volume down on the radio. We
performed our before take-off check and looked for
traffic on final, base, and downwind for Runway 22.
We did not turn the volume up on the radio (some
takeoff check) nor did we announce our departure.
While on the takeoff roll, the pilot not flying suddenly
grabbed the controls, only to release them again
allowing me to continue the takeoff, but pointed out
[another aircraft] on short final for Runway 10! We
were well past the intersection prior to his
touchdown, but this was just a little too close.
There were a number of factors leading up to this
incident. First and foremost, the concept of “See and
Avoid” was not practiced. Unlike what I teach my
students, we only checked the pattern we were using
and did not accomplish a 360 to check the whole
area… Nor did we have the radio volume turned up.
This was another factor. There is no excuse for not
monitoring UNICOM or announcing our intentions.
Probably the most important factor, I feel, was the
delineation of who actually was PIC and who was to
do what. Though I was “sole manipulator of the
　
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