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fuel. This instruction is not applicable on long-haul flights, such as SK946. According to
the pilots’ statements it is a normal procedure to change approach sequence with another
company aircraft which have a better fuel situation.
In the OFP fuel calculations of the flight SK946 the fuel at the point of 30 NM was 7.0 t.
There was also printed in the flight log part of the OFP on the next line after ELTOK abbreviation
STAR, distance of 30 NM and time 12 minutes. The pilots told that they had
7.0 t of fuel at the reporting point ELTOK. According to the aircraft FM ACTIVE POSTFLIGHT
REPORT the fuel on board by ELTOK was 7.2 t. The direct distance from ELTOK
to rwy 01L threshold is a little more than 30 NM and in a normal radar vectoring it
takes approximately 40-45 NM track miles. Thus the 30 NM, which is prescribed in RODOS
-calculations is not at ELTOK but somewhat later.
C 9/2003 L
Airliner landing with low fuel at Helsinki-Vantaa airport on 3.10.2003
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In the RODOS OFP the line after ELTOK was misleading because the text “STAR
Stockholm/Arlanda 30….12” is possible to understand that via a standard arrival route
the flight distance to Arlanda is 30 NM and the flight time is 12 minutes. When the pilots
had calculated the estimated arrival time to Arlanda they had added to the time by ELTOK
04.51 12 minutes and had got the arrival time of 05.03. Based on these markings
the pilots had an assumption that the flight time from ELTOK to landing would be 12
minutes.
The LVP were in force and CAT II operation will reduce landing capacity to 65% according
to the AIP Sweden. CAT II operation means 7 NM spacing between arrivals
causing longer tracks for approaching traffic. The ATC applies speed restrictions and it
is not possible to fly in clean configuration until 10 NM as it is calculated in RODOS
Planning system. A CAT II approach to Arlanda requires more fuel than the planning
system calculates. The pilots should consider in flight planning which kind of approach
they may possibly have to make in the destination. Also the possible holding must be
taken into account. It is not a good airmanship to use the alternate fuel for the approach
to the destination in bad weather conditions.
The pilots told that they expected to be as number one in the approach sequence when
they had got the privilege approach without holding. The commander told that they believed
to be already on the left base leg when they got a 90 degrees right turn to the opposite
direction of the final approach. According to the FM ACTIVE POSTFLIGHT REPORT
the flight time from ELTOK to runway 01L threshold took 20 minutes when the
calculated flight time in the OFP was 12 minutes. Calculated from the flight time with an
average approach speed of 210 KT the actual distance flown by SK946 from ELTOK to
threshold 01L about 65 track miles instead of the 30 NM printed in the OFP. The approach
route of SK946 can also be seen in the figure 1.
The runway visual range on the used runway 01L was during the CAT II approach
above the landing minima 400 m and the approach was stable, but the pilots did not see
the approach or runway lights from their decision height of 165 feet measured by radio
altimeters. The commander started the missed approach procedure at 05.16 and the
pilots saw the runway lights for a moment during the missed approach. The fuel on
board was 6.1 t and the required fuel from the missed approach point to Helsinki-Vantaa
was 6.0 t according to the OFP. According to the FM POSTFLIGHT report SK946 used
from ELTOK to missed approach point fuel 1100 kg. The flight time was 20 minutes and
the average consumption 55 kg/min. Based on this consumption the approach fuel of
600 kg for 12 minutes approach (50 kg/min) calculated in the OFP is not sufficient for a
radar vectoring followed by a CAT II approach in Arlanda LVP conditions. Scandinavian
Airlines should order the commanders to take fuel enough for approach paying attention
to possible delays caused by the traffic and weather conditions.
The decision height (DH) is measured from the lowest point of the aircraft, from the main
wheels. According to the A330 FCOM the cockpit is 34 feet above the main wheels and
the pilots sit at a height of 199 when they are on CAT II DH. Thus a considerable longer
slant visibility is required to get the lights in sight in a A330 than in a smaller aircraft
where the cockpit height is only a little more than 100 feet above the runway level at the
DH. This has to be taken into account when determining the required RVR for the A330,
C 9/2003 L
Airliner landing with low fuel at Helsinki-Vantaa airport on 3.10.2003
26
but in practice in a thick fog and RVR of 400 m the slant visibility from 199 feet is not
　
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