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These occurrences are then analysed in detail each week by a panel of Airbus
specialists.
One of the tasks of this review consists of undertaking, for each occurrence,
a preliminary evaluation of the impact on airworthiness according to the
following classification:
 Occurrence with no consequences for airworthiness. These occurrences
are closed quickly;
 Occurrence that can lead to an unsafe condition. These occurrences are
subject to processing and closure with EASA (see following paragraph);
 The other occurrences are subject to in-depth analysis and must normally
be covered by a risk assessment that allows either for the closure of the
occurrence or proposes a plan of action for closure within a period of three
months.
After each weekly meeting the list of occurrences that can lead to an unsafe
condition is sent to EASA. In accordance with the provisions put in place
between EASA and Airbus, Airbus is authorised to close the other occurrences
internally after analysis, identification of the problems and implementation of
the corrective measures.
These are issued by Airbus to operators in the form of simple information,
reminders relative to procedures, operating or technical methods; or actions,
modifications or inspections to be carried out.
1.17.6.4.4.3 Processing of occurrences that may lead to an “unsafe condition”
General principle
These occurrences are processed by Airbus and then presented to EASA at
the time of ARMs meetings (Airworthiness Review Meeting) or at the time of
specific meetings or phone conferences for urgent matters.
If action is required to remedy an “unsafe condition”, EASA may at any
moment decide to issue an Airworthiness Directive in coordination with the
manufacturer.
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59
Initial processing by Airbus
The follow up of each open occurrence is presented by Airbus to EASA. This
follow up includes the history of the occurrence, the safety analysis performed,
planned corrective actions and the position of Airbus and EASA, in particular
in relation the need to issue an Airworthiness Directive. This document is filled
in regularly until closure of the occurrence.
Processing at the ARM meeting
Each occurrence is presented during these meetings which bring together the
Airbus and EASA specialists in the area of airworthiness and safety.
This meeting allows:
 Airbus to present for each event the conclusions of its analysis and a
corrective actions plan;
 EASA to examine the work presented by Airbus and, if necessary, strengthen
the proposed action plan;
 Airbus and EASA to reach agreement on the conclusions, the level of
impact with respect to airworthiness and the corrective action plan to be
implemented.
Where applicable, EASA may decide to issue an Airworthiness Directive.
Note: Certain occurrences are presented to the ARM meeting that are not classifi ed as
likely to lead to “unsafe conditions” but for which, due to their recurrent or specifi c nature,
it has been decided to put in place special monitoring.
1.17.6.5 Monitoring of Airbus, the manufacturer, by EASA
EASA organises the oversight of Airbus’ design agreement in such a way as to
cover all of its areas of activity over a three-year cycle. The last audit relating
to occurrences was carried out in November 2007. EASA concluded that the
overall organisation was satisfactory.
1.17.6.6 Special case of inconsistencies in measured speeds
The cases of inconsistencies in measured speeds are classified as major in the
safety analysis that describes the associated failure conditions.
At the time of the transfer of the continuing airworthiness dossiers relating
to the A330 from the DGAC to EASA in 2003, EASA was informed of a case of
temporary speed inconsistency in crews whose analysis was still underway at
the DGAC.
EASA was then not made aware of any other cases until 17 September 2008
for long-range airplanes (A330 and A340), at which date the DGAC forwarded
to EASA a letter from the Director of the Air Caraïbes airline concerning two
events where there was loss of speed indications on two of the airline’s A330s.
The latter, in particular, said that he had taken the decision to replace the
C16195AA Pitot probes with the C16195BA standard on its entire A330 fleet in
accordance with SB A330-34-3206, and asked DGAC for its position regarding
this type of incident.
F-GZCP - 1st June 2009
60
DGAC forwarded this letter to EASA on 17 September 2008 asking it whether
it was planning on making Service Bulletin SB A330-34-3206 mandatory by
　
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