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anticipate this three failure cases and is designed to smooth the aircraft handling transient.
TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
FLIGHT CONTROL ARCHITECTURE AND FAILURES
For a clear understanding, we will study the following example: Loss of the green hydraulic
system and PRIM 2, which triggers the F/CTL ELEV REDUND LOST procedure, followed by a
SEC2 failure.
Normal situation (before any failure)
A330/A340 FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL
ABNORMAL OPERATIONS
FLIGHT CONTROLS
A330/A340 FLEET AO-027 P 4/6
FCTM 17 JUN 09
Green hydraulic loss (first failure)
Green hydraulic power is lost. Flight controls computers will switch, this allows the ailerons and
elevators to be recovered.
PRIM 2 loss (Second failure)
The F/CTL ELEV REDUND LOST procedure is triggered at this stage (when two failures occur).
The crew should note that, at this stage, both elevators and all ailerons are available.
A330/A340 FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL
ABNORMAL OPERATIONS
FLIGHT CONTROLS
A330/A340 FLEET AO-027 P 5/6
FCTM 17 JUN 09
SEC 2 loss (third failure)
At this stage, both elevators are lost and only left outboard aileron is available.
FAILED AILERON BEHAVIOUR
When an aileron is failed (due to failure of its hydraulic supply and/or electrical control and/or
servojack), it goes to its zero hinge moment corresponding to around 14 ° up. This produces
a loss of lift which creates a pitch up moment. The elevators, when available, compensate this
effect.
• For the cases where three consecutive failures affecting flight controls lead to the
simultaneous loss of both elevators and some ailerons, a 12 ° upwards aileron preset is
anticipated (before the third failure) and the resulting pitch up effect can be compensated
by the elevators (which are available at this stage) and then trimmed by the THS. This 12 °
upwards aileron preset is a compromise between fuel consumption increase (around 16 %)
and the pitch up effect at the time of the third failure. This aileron preset is displayed on
ECAM FCTL page.
If the third and dimensioning failure occurs, three ailerons and both elevators are lost. The
failed ailerons go to their zero hinge moment (14 ° up). As the ailerons were previously preset
upwards (12 ° up), the transient is smooth. Only a slight upward movement occur but is
controllable through the THS. MAN PITCH TRIM ONLY is displayed on the top of PFD.
• For the cases where three consecutive failures affecting flight controls may lead to the
simultaneous loss of one elevator and some ailerons, no aileron-preset anticipation is
required. This can be visualized on ECAM FCTL page.
If the third and dimensioning failure occurs, the remaining elevator compensates the pitch up
effect.
PROCEDURE GUIDELINES
Depending on the combination of failures, the AP might be not available. Indeed, in case of
ailerons preset, the AP behaviour is less than optimum and automatically disconnects.
A330/A340 FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL
ABNORMAL OPERATIONS
FLIGHT CONTROLS
A330/A340 FLEET AO-027 P 6/6
FCTM 17 JUN 09
Below 2 000 ft or when in CONF 2 however, the aileron preset is cancelled to facilitate the landing
manoeuvre and permit the use of AP if available.
The ELEV REDUND LOST procedure requires both speed and FL limitations:
• The speed limitation is introduced to cope with aircraft structure effort, should a third
dimensioning failure occur.
• The FL limitation is introduced to maintain stabilizer authority, should a third dimensioning
failure occur.
LDG CONF- APPR SPD - LDG DIST corrections for failures in QRH must be referred. As F/CTL
ELEV REDUND LOST is a result of a multiple failures, refer to the use of tables for multiple failure
memo.
The decision to divert remains at captain's discretion and is mainly linked to the moment where the
failure occurs and to operational considerations such as maintenance, passengers' convenience....
The aft CG warning is generated by the Flight Envelope (FE) computer as a function of the THS
position. In case of aileron preset, the THS position counteracts the pitch up effect inducing an
erroneous CG computation. This is why any aft CG warning should be disregarded. CG, computed
by the FCMC and displayed on ECAM, remains reliable (Refer to SI-040 general)
If a third dimensioning failure occurs leading to the loss of both elevators:
• The aircraft longitudinal control is ensured through MAN PITCH TRIM ONLY
• The A/THR may be disconnected to limit engine acceleration/deceleration thus facilitating the
aircraft longitudinal control.
• The FL and speed limitations no longer apply
A330/A340 FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL
　
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