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teamwork as the airplane was on its landing run, as well as the co-pilot's
inadequate degree of professional training in terms of controlling the work
parameters of the engines and the airplane's speed while on its landing run and,
consequently, the late report to the airplane captain about the increase in engine
rpm. The audio and light emergency warning signal (incorrect take-off
configuration), which is not related to this stage of the flight, was unexpected for
the crew and could have made recognition of the developing situation difficult.
5. The unusual behavior of the airplane, especially the strong turn to the
right, increased the mental and physiological load on the pilots and facilitated
the distraction of attention from control over the engine rpm and speed,
especially when it came to the co-pilot.
1.18.3. Information about previous incidents
A-310-associated occurrences
During the course of the Commission’s work, it was established that,
over the period of operation of A-310 airplane, at least three incidents related to
the increase in forward thrust of engines whose reverser was deactivated as the
airplane was on its landing run. Reference data about these events is presented in
the table below:
№ in
order
Date Place Registration,
operator
Type of
airplane,
engine
1 March 3, 1999 Moscow (UUEE)
Russia
UK-31001 (Uzbekistan),
Uzbekiston Havo Yullari
A-310-324
PW4000
2 March 3, 2004 Dacca (DAC),
Bangladesh
S2-ADF (Bangladesh),
BBC (Bangladesh)
А-310-325
PW4000
3 March 8, 2005 Teheran (THR),
Iran
F-OJHH (France),
Mahan Air (Iran)
А-310-304
CF6-80
1. On March 2, 1999 a crew of the airline Uzbekistan Havo Yullari on
an A-310 airplane UK-31001 was flying on an international route from Tashkent
to Moscow, landing at Sheremetevo. At 01:19 (Moscow time) the airplane
landed on runway 25R. The runway was damp and in some places was covered
with ice. The friction coefficient was 0.35 along its entire length. Before
Final Report
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AVIATION COMMITTEE
73
landing, the engines were brought to idle. The landing was carried out under
automatic mode from a distance of 520 meters from the entry threshold. After
landing, the spoilers were automatically released and braking commenced in
LOW mode. The reverser on the engines was not used since the reverse
mechanisms of both engines were deactivated. About 9 seconds after the nose
gear was lowered, the TCL of both engines started to move forward (for 9
seconds) to increase forward thrust to 44.5 according to the FDR. The TCL
remained in this position right up to a distance of 3000 m from the entry
threshold, after which the crew recognized the situation and both TCLs were
transferred to idle. At a distance of 1800 meters from the entry threshold and at a
speed of about 180 kph the crew initiated active forcible deceleration. Because
of the low friction coefficient and late discovery of the irregular position of the
TCL, the airplane could not stop on the runway and overran the runway at a
speed of about 60 kph.
The investigating commission concluded that this incident was not
related to the functioning of the aviation equipment but was a consequence of
the involuntary shifting of the TCL to forward thrust mode and the crew's lack
of control over engine rpm during the landing run, as well as the little
experience of the crew in executing landings on a damp runway that was
covered with ice in some places.
The conclusion of the State Center for Flight Safety in Air Transport
(SCFSAT) that was based on the results of the investigation into the
circumstances of this incident contains the conclusion that "the movement of the
TCLs to forward thrust modes most probably occurred inadvertently (that is,
with no efforts exercised by the crew on the levers). It was impossible to
determine the reason for the inadvertent movement of the TCL based on
available data". With the exception of one ground experiment on a similar
airplane (and not on the airplane that was in the accident), no studies of the
engine control system were presented to confirm this conclusion. The
developers of the airplane and engines were not invited to take part in the
investigation.
The investigating commission did not share the opinion of SCFSAT
regarding the inadvertent movement of the TCL, and the quality and
completeness of the studies that were carried out to investigate this incident gave
rise to serious criticism.
Based on results of the investigation of this incident, the commission
failed to draw up specific recommendations to the flight crew or developers of
　
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