曝光臺 注意防騙 網曝天貓店富美金盛家居專營店坑蒙拐騙欺詐消費者

1. PМ-130 (ZIL-130) 1983-99 4 AS repaired
2. КО-713 (ZIL-130) 1989 2 AS same
3. VМ-63 (Kraz 258) 1981,91 2 AS same
4. ТМ-59 (Т-155) 1986 2 AS same
5. D224 (МОАЗ546) 1983-88 4 AS same
6. К-700 1985,88 2 AS same
7. D226 (URAL4320) 1988 1 AS same
8. D902 (URAL-375) 1983 1 AS same
9. SSU "BARS" 2002 2 AS same
10. D-470 (ZIL-157) 1984 1 AS same
11. Т-170 1994 1 AS same
12. DZ-122 (Grader) 1988 1 AS same
13. PSh-120-01 2000 1 AS same
14. VU-1500 2001 1 AS same
15. АТТ-2 (semi-trailer) 1992 1 AS same
16. ZSh-6 (trailer) 2001 1 AS same
17. PKSD-1.75 (set) 2000 1 AS same
18. Toyota Hiace 1993 1 AS same
19. К-701 loader 1991 1 AS same
20. VАZ-21213 2002 1 AS same
21. Mounted mower КRN-2.1А 2003 1 AS same
Note: The commission was particularly interested in the capability of the
airport service of Irkutsk airport to effectively assess the condition of the runway
while establishing the coefficient of friction, including at the time preceding the
accident, and while making control measurements after the accident.
It is known that in order to boost the efficiency and quality of the
information obtained when measuring the friction coefficient of the paved
runways to evaluate their functional properties, and to practice using methods
and tools for measuring the friction coefficient in compliance with ICAO
requirements (Doc 9137-AN/898 – Airport Services Guidelines), the Ministry of
Transport of the Russian Federation issued Directive no. NA-30-r on January
24, 2001, recommending that heads of civil aviation organizations in 25
principal airports of the Russian Federation (Irkutsk airport is no. 4 in the
enclosed list) ensure that any measuring devices available on site by 2002, of
which there should be at least two, were equipped with measuring modules and
to process the results of measuring the friction coefficient instead of using visual
recording equipment modules. However, as the commission found out, this
directive was not implemented, particularly at Irkutsk airport.
The friction coefficient of 0.50 provided to the A-310 crew in the prelanding
airport information service ATIS, as the runway condition was
determined to be "wet 100%, 2mm" and as braking conditions were considered
"good", was not confirmed by the result of the mathematical simulation carried
Final Report
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AVIATION COMMITTEE
44
out by Airbus specialists, where the runway surface at the moment of the
airplane’s landing was evaluated in terms of its frictional properties as "covered
with water" for at least the last 2/3 of the runway.
1.11. Flight Recorders
The А-310 F-OGYP was equipped with a digital flight data recorder
(DFDR) (part no. 10077A500-103, model 209, serial no. 156). This device was
recovered from the accident site. The outside casing showed traces of soot.
There was no external mechanical damage. The lead wires were cut off when the
recorder was removed from the accident site. The recording was read out and the
data obtained analyzed at the Interstate Aviation Commission. The last 5
seconds of data were irrecoverable, but this did not prevent the investigators
from establishing the causes and development of this particular event.
The airplane's voice recorder was removed from the accident site: solidstate
memory cockpit voice recorder (CVR), part no. 980-6020-001, serial no.
3644, data code 0030. The recorder had traces of soot. There was no external
mechanical damage. The connector was clean.
The Interstate Aviation Commission laboratory listened to and identified
the conversations of the crew. The total recording time of the last flight was 31
minutes. The quality of the recording was satisfactory. The CVR was
synchronized with the decrypted recording of the DFDR and used during the
investigation.
1.12. Wreckage and Impact Information
The following was established during examination of the accident site:
The airplane's center wing section was located 310 m towards the front of
the threshold of runway 30, 30 m to the right of the runway center line with the
magnetic heading of the construction line of the fuselage at 270°.
Fragments of the fuselage from bulkheads 1 to 39 had major mechanical
and heat damage. Some fragments were destroyed by the fire.
Fragments of the forward section of the fuselage were shifted 7 meters to
the right of the fuselage's construction line during the emergency rescue work.
The original location of these fragments was impossible to determine.
The nose landing gear was separated from the fuselage, had mechanical
　
中國航空網 m.k6050.com
航空翻譯 www.aviation.cn
本文鏈接地址：FINAL REPORT ON THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCI(20)