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wake turbulence separation standards. Focus of the review should be on the standards
for the wide range of “heavy” airplanes currently in operation, and for larger aircraft,
such as the Airbus A380 coming in the near future. This examination should include
new technology and should study proposals for improving controller training and
understanding of wake vortices, including variables such as relative wind,
atmospheric stability, and ATC vectoring.
4. The NTSB should recommend that the FAA comply with open Safety
Recommendation A-94-056 which states, “Require manufacturers of turbojet,
transport category airplanes to determine, by flight test or other suitable means, the
characteristics of the airplanes’ wake vortices during certification environment.”
5. The NTSB should recommend installation of unfiltered, high sample rate DFDRs in
all transport category aircraft. Further, the NTSB should recommend that a detailed
analysis of operational data from those aircraft with reports of unexpected
performance variances be made available as part of Service Difficulty Reports
(SDRs) required of aircraft manufacturers.
6. The NTSB should recommend that the French DGAC require Airbus to develop
formal training for all operators of the A310 and A300-600 similar to that developed
by American for its A300-600 pilots. This airplane-specific training should go beyond
NTSB Safety Recommendation A-02-01 and focus on: (1) the unusually sensitive
rudder; (2) the yaw damper design; (3) the limited capability of the RTLU to
compensate for acceleration; and (4) the unique APC susceptibility of the A300-600
and the A310. Training should recognize that the piloting techniques used when
flying other transport category airplanes may not safely transfer when transitioning
from those airplanes to the A310/A300-600.
7. The NTSB should recommend that the FAA require manufacturers of transport
category airplanes either manufactured in or imported into the United States develop
FAA-approved advanced maneuver training programs, including specific
32
documentation and guidance for classroom and simulator training specific to each
airplane.
8. The NTSB should recommend that the FAA Office of System Safety (OSS) review
the findings of the AA 587 investigation to determine why these system safety
failures occurred. This effort should include a team of qualified individuals from
industry and government, including representatives of the French DGAC and FAA
certification officials. The stated goal of the review should be to identify and
understand the system safety failures so as to prevent, if possible, the re-occurrence of
a tragedy like AA 587.
9. The NTSB should recommend that the FAA more specifically define the definition of
‘maneuvering speed,’ as it pertains to all categories of aircraft and, in so doing,
clearly outline the differences of assumptions as they apply to the three primary flight
control surfaces. All manufacturers’ flight manuals and other associated documents
for airplanes certified in or imported into the United States accordingly should also be
revised to reflect the proper meaning and use of the term ‘maneuvering speed.’
10. The NTSB should recommend a much more aggressive compliance of system safety
practices as outlined in the FAA System Safety Handbook. The Assistant
Administrator of System Safety (ASY) and office staff should be empowered to act as
an independent technical authority to ensure system safety practices are used through
the life cycle of the various systems receiving FAA approval or certification. The
NTSB should revise Safety Recommendation A-96-64 to the FAA, re-emphasizing
the pertinence of the recommendation to aviation safety. This recommendation
resulted from the 1994 Roselawn, Indiana, accident and now directly applies to this
accident. The recommendation states, “Establish policies and procedures to ensure
that all pertinent information is received, including the manufacturer’s analysis of
incidents, accidents or other airworthiness issues, from the exporting country’s
airworthiness authority so that the FAA can monitor and ensure the continued
airworthiness of airplanes certified under the Bilateral Airworthiness Agreement.”
11. The NTSB should recommend the various governmental agencies responsible for the
bilateral agreements which allow foreign manufacturers to qualify for U.S.
certification form a team to review the aircraft certification process. Emphasis should
be placed on ensuring that the standards of 14 CFR Part 25 are met fully prior to
certification consideration.
DOT/FAA/AR-05/26
Office of Aviation Research
　
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