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encounters, unexpected ceiling and/or visibility issues, disorientation, loss of positional
or situational awareness, loss of aircraft control, controlled flight toward terrain
(CFTT), and severe turbulence. In short, any weather encounter that affects safety of
flight will be analyzed. Contributing elements such as pilot experience, training,
proficiency, weather briefings, and aircraft equipment will also be studied.
While most aircraft involved in weather encounter events reported to ASRS are
expected to be light single and twin, piston-engine aircraft, all aircraft and rotorcraft
involved in FAR Part 91 and 135 operations are to be included in this study— piston,
turboprop, or jet.
The time frame for this effort is from April 2005 through September 2005.
In order to provide the level of detail needed to fully understand the hazardous
situation and the factors affecting it, ASRS will begin contacting pilots who report
general aviation weather encounters to request their voluntary participation in
completing a written survey questionnaire. Reporter participation in the survey is
strongly encouraged.
All identifying information (names, company affiliations, etc.) will be removed before
the ASRS research data is given to the FAA.
To support FAA and industry efforts to improve awareness, knowledge, training, and
procedures related to aviation weather, ASRS strongly encourages general aviation
pilots who experience adverse weather encounters to report these incidents to the
Program and to participate in the Weather Encounters Study.
Lessons from the Line
Altitude and track or heading deviations continue to
represent a significant percentage of the incidents
submitted to ASRS. In each of the following reports, the
deviations resulted when automation failed to perform as
expected. Each report also contains an observation
worth noting.

We were cruising at FL350 when Center directed a
descent to FL250. The Captain set the new altitude in the
FCU and I pushed the Altitude button for a managed
descent. We were discussing the arrival, weather, etc., when
Center asked us what our assigned altitude was. I looked
up and saw that we were still at FL 350. We began an
immediate descent and Center then gave us a vector…. I
know I pushed the Altitude button on the FCU…. My
mistake was that I didn’t confirm a reaction from the
airplane…. The lesson is obvious, as it always is –
never trust the airplane to do (or not do) something
and be extra diligent to double check it, especially
when tired, hurried, or late which seems to be the
company standard anymore….

ATC cleared us to cross five miles south of FIX at
13,000 feet. We were at 15,000 feet and the restriction was
entered into the FMS. We began discussing landing data
and ended up crossing the restriction at 15,000 feet. ATC
asked our altitude and we immediately descended to
13,000 feet with a rapid descent rate. The controller gave
us a heading off the route…. Our discussion distracted
us from monitoring the aircraft’s response to our
input….

We were cruising at FL280 when ATC instructed us to
cross 45 miles south of FIX at FL240. The Captain entered
a crossing of 240 at FIX -45 in the FMS. It was verified
and executed. I also verified that VNAV was still
engaged…. Approximately five miles south of FIX, ATC
called and asked what distance we were from FIX. The
aircraft had not started the descent. I replied that we had
just noticed the same thing and were in a rapid descent to
FL240. Monitoring changes of aircraft attitude
should take precedence over all other activities.
Way back in the days of the Wright Flyer and the
Boeing 737-200, aircraft control was directly
dependent upon real-time pilot input. The “pilot
action — aircraft reaction” algorithm tended to
reduce the possibility of distraction or complacency
during aircraft maneuvering.
In today’s fully automated, glass cockpit
environment, the pilot’s role has become more
supervisory and the requirement for direct control
input is diminished or absent. When automation
functions reliably, as it does most of the time, it can
induce pilots to be less alert in monitoring its
behavior. As these recent ASRS reports illustrate,
pilots must guard against distractions and
automation complacency in order to ensure that
the aircraft performs as directed and anticipated.

ATC instructed us to descend from FL350 to FL340.
The pilot flying set FL340 in the auto-pilot altitude
window. The pilot not flying verified it and saw the pilot
　
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