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R6.9 ICAO (Internation Civil Aviation Organization), Manual on Required Navigation
Performance (RNP). Doc. 9613-AN/937. Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 1994.
R6.10 AWOP, Fifteenth Meeting of the All Weather Operations Panel, ICAO, 26
September - 12 October 1994. Montreal, Quebec, Canada.
R6.11 Shepherd, Roger, Rick Cassell, and Edwin Alphonso, “Reduced Aircraft
Separation On Final Approach - A Review Of Separation Risk Models” Alexandria, VA:
Rannoch Corp., 1996 (draft report).
R6.12 Shepherd, Roger, Rick Cassell, Rajeev Thapa, and Derrick Lee, "A Reduced
Aircraft Separation Risk Assessment Model,” Proceedings of the AIAA Guidance,
Navigation, and Control Conference, New Orleans, August 10-13, 1997.
EXISTING MODELS AND MODELING TOOLS
6-27
Additional References for Model Evaluation (re: TOPAZ)
· Bakker, G.J. and H.A.P. Blom, Air Traffic Collision Risk Modelling, Proc. 32nd IEEE
Conf. on Decision and Control, December 1993, pp. 1464-1469 (NLR report TP
93292 U).
· Blom, H.A.P. and G.J. Bakker, A Macroscopic Assessment of the Target Safety Gain
for Different En-Route Airspace Structures within SUATMS, NLR report CR 93364
L, 1993.
· Everdij, M.H.C., M.B. Klompstra, H.A.P. Blom & O.N. Fota, Final Report on Safety
Model, Part I: Evaluation of Hazard Analysis Techniques for Application to En-
Route ATM, NLR report TR 96196 L, December 1995.
· Everdij, M.H.C., M.B. Klompstra & H.A.P. Blom, Final Report on Safety Model,
Part II: Development of Mathematical Techniques for ATM Safety Analysis, NLR TR
96197L, 1996.
· Everdij, M.H.C., G.J. Bakker and H.A.P. Blom, Application of Collision Risk Tree
Analysis to DCIA/CRDA through Support from TOPAZ, NLR contract report, 1996.
· Everdij, M.H.C., H.A.P. Blom and M.B. Klompstra, Dynamically Coloured Petri Nets
for Air Traffic Management Safety Purposes, Proc. 8th IFAC Symposium on
Transportation Systems, Crete, Greece June 1997 (Pre-print available from NLR).
SEPARATION SAFETY MODELING
6-28
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FACTORS POTENTIALLY AFFECTING SEPARATION SAFETY
7-1
7.0 FACTORS POTENTIALLY AFFECTING SEPARATION SAFETY
(Factors That May Need To Be Included In The Model)
7.1 INTRODUCTION
As separation minima shrink, many factors that have negligible impact on safety when
separations are large assume vital importance. Because of the many safeguards and
redundancies built into airspace systems, the probability of a midair collision is extremely
small. If a midair collision does occur, it is likely the result of a very rare combination of
events. Therefore, to properly model the risk of a midair collision in an environment of
reduced separation, it is necessary to consider the impact of rare events and even rarer
combinations of events. A wake turbulence encounter also may pose a hazard depending
on other factors.
For many, there is a strong propensity to dismiss both the possibility of rare events and
rare combinations of events and the possibility that these might result in an accident.
Indeed, even the most thoughtful and pessimistic individual cannot think of all possible
hazardous rare events.
To model the risk of a midair collision or serious wake vortex encounter in an
environment of reduced separations, one must decide what factors are important to
include in the model. It is therefore necessary to first identify factors that might be critical
in accurately determining such risk. The Separation Safety Modeling Team has begun the
development of a list of such factors.
The list is in outline form. The subject headings were chosen for convenience¾other
headings might serve as well. The placement of factors under a heading is often
arbitrary¾often a factor might well fit under a number of headings. Thus, the headings do
not imply mutual exclusivity. A factor listed under one heading should perhaps be listed
under other headings as well, but to save space, we have tried (but not always succeeded!)
to minimize this. However, some factors appear under more than one category because
they may take on a slightly different meaning under each. The order does not imply
expected importance.
Although not shown here, interactions and time dependencies among factors in different
parts of the outline will occur¾some of these are the unfortunate ones that cause
accidents. This outline is certainly not a complete list, but it contains more factors than
could be considered explicitly in any feasible risk model. Part of the modeling task is to
determine which of the factors and interactions are the critical ones.
A more realistic display of the factors would be in the form of a network or circuit
　
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