曝光臺 注意防騙 網曝天貓店富美金盛家居專營店坑蒙拐騙欺詐消費者

Surveillance and Monitoring of Restricted Airspace.  Surveillance and monitoring capabilities present a significant challenge for protecting airspace.  This is, in part, because detailed information on specific GA aircraft is not provided to air traffic controllers and airspace monitors unless the aircraft is transmitting a unique identifying code to air traffic radar sites.  Under the current radar system, providing GA aircraft with unique identifiers and tracking all GA aircraft could, at times, prove overwhelming for air traffic controllers.  Under present day air traffic control procedures, pilots must file flight plans, receive unique identifier codes to transmit, and make radio calls to air traffic controllers to establish “radar contact”allowing controllers to identify and track a specific flight.  Under normal circumstances in clear weather, many flights never file a flight plan nor contact air traffic controllers
92 See, e.g., Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association.  Members of Congress Join AOPA Outcry Over Presidential Movement TFRs. Frederick, MD; May 16, 2003.
because they are not required to do so. But, to operate inside certain restricted airspace like the Washington, DC ADIZ, pilots must follow the aforementioned procedures for filing flight plans, transmitting unique identifying codes, and communicating with air traffic controllers – procedures that are often workload intensive for both pilots and controllers. Technologies may provide a solution that could ease pilot and controller workload associated with these transactions.  For example, Mode S transponders are capable of automatically relaying detailed aircraft identifier information to air traffic radars, but most smaller GA aircraft do not have this technology and it is expensive to install.  Similarly, emerging technology called Automated Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) can transmit detailed aircraft information to ground stations and other aircraft, but this new technology is only beginning to become available and surveillance capability is not yet available in all parts of the United States.  While ADS-B shows significant promise for improving safety as well as security, the FAA is still reviewing its investment strategy in this technology. In the meantime, surveillance of GA aircraft must rely on current radar capabilities, involving close coordination between pilots and air traffic controllers.  This imposes additional workload on both pilots and controllers. This increased workload has a direct bearing on FAA resources.  For example, the FAA estimates that making the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) around Washington, DC permanent will cost about $11 million per year, mostly linked to increased labor costs associated with processing flight plans and providing air traffic services to aircraft operating under visual flight rules (VFR) that would otherwise present little or no impact on the air traffic control system.93
Airspace Protection and Homeland Defense. Besides the resources and costs associated with monitoring flights, the capability to establish formidable airspace protections in restricted airspace is a central issue for homeland security. The effectiveness of airspace protections and interagency coordination in providing homeland security and defense is at the crux of the policy debate over effective airspace security.  This is because airspace restrictions by themselves are not particularlyuseful tools unless a coordinated response to protect critical assets within those protected areas are effective.  Merely relying on enforcement tools is not likely to be of significant benefit because terrorists are likely to care little that they are violating airspace restrictions in carrying out an attack. 
　
中國航空網 m.k6050.com
航空翻譯 www.aviation.cn
本文鏈接地址：Securing General Aviation(40)