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65 Transportation Security Administration.  “Threat Assessment Regarding Citizens of the United States and Alien Holders Who Hold or Apply for FAA Certificates; Final Rules.” Federal Register, 68(16), pp. 3756-3769 (January 24, 2003). 
66 See, e.g., Llewellyn King. “Adm. Loy, You Know Better: Rescind This Rule.”  White House Weekly, 24(10), March 11, 2003, 1-2. 
67 Transportation Security Administration.  Memorandum to the Dockets from Pamela Hamilton, Director of Aviation Initiatives Regarding TSA Rulemaking Docket No. TSA-2002-13732 and TSA Rulemaking Docket No. TSA-2002-13733.  March 16,2004.
68 Title 14 CFR §1544.101 and §1544.230.
frequent the airport are largely known to each other.  Nevertheless, background checks and other vetting activities have been looked upon favorably by policymakers as a core component of a layered security system and could be further expanded in their application to GA operators.
One area where background checks and security threat assessments is being incorporated into GA operations is for the vetting of prospective charter and lease customers. Under statutory provisions set forth in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458, Sec. 4012), the TSA is charged with the task of setting up a mechanism for charter and aircraft lease operators to voluntarily submit the names of prospective clients seeking access to aircraft weighing more than 12,500 pounds for screening against the consolidated terrorist watch list.  Aircraft operators may deny individuals access to aircraft if their name is found to match watch list records. While the legislative language limited the applicability of this vetting procedure to aircraft weighing more than 12,500 pounds, the feasibility of extending this capability to charters and leases of smaller aircraft, based on the initial experience with larger aircraft, was debated during consideration of this legislation.  While terrorist database screening of prospective charter and lease customers as legislated is voluntary, policymakers may also consider whether mandatory screening of aircraft charter and lease customers is warranted.  However, because the capability to screen names against terrorist watch list information is tied to the functionality of the controversial Secure Flight program for prescreening airline passengers, implementation of a charter and lease customer prescreening mechanism – which is currently not operational –  may be further delayed by ongoing difficulties in meeting congressionally mandated safeguards for data and privacy protections and redress and remedy for aggrieved individuals who are erroneously identified as suspected or known terrorists.69  Presently, language in the FY2006 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-90) prohibits full-scale deployment of the Secure Flight system until the GAO certifies that these lingering concerns are adequately addressed.
　
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