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general, the higher risk items will require more quantitative analysis than low or medium risk hazards. The
example below is qualitative.
Many controls exist to preclude this hazard from occurring-
Multiple radios both in the aircraft and in the ATC facility provide redundant communication channels from
aircraft to ATC.
In the event of failure multiple facilities can be used including FSS, other ARTCC, TRACON, or ATCC,
even airborne telephones.
1. Planning systems assist in keeping aircraft at different altitudes or routes. Emergency procedures exist to
ensure an aircraft in “lost communication” will not converge on another aircraft’s flight path.
1 Federal Aviation Administration. (1995). Airman’s Information Manual. Para. 4-2-1.
FAA System Safety Handbook, Appendix B: Comparative Risk Assessment (CRA) Form
December 30, 2000
B-8
Severity Definitions
Catastrophic Results in multiple fatalities and/or loss of the system
Hazardous
Reduces the capability of the system or the operator ability to cope
with adverse conditions to the extent that there would be:
Large reduction in safety margin or functional capability
Crew physical distress/excessive workload such that operators
cannot be relied upon to perform required tasks accurately or
completely
(1) Serious or fatal injury to small number of occupants of aircraft
(except operators)
Fatal injury to ground personnel and/or general public
Major
Reduces the capability of the system or the operators to cope with
adverse operating condition to the extent that there would be –
Significant reduction in safety margin or functional capability
Significant increase in operator workload
Conditions impairing operator efficiency or creating significant
discomfort
Physical distress to occupants of aircraft (except operator)
including injuries
Major occupant illness and/or major environmental damage, and/or
major property damage
Minor
Does not significantly reduce system safety. Actions required by
operators are well within their capabilities. Include
Slight reduction in safety margin or functional capabilities
Slight increase in workload such as routine flight plan changes
Some physical discomfort to occupants or aircraft (except
operators)
No Safety Effect
Has no effect on safety
FAA System Safety Handbook, Appendix C: Related Readings in Aviation System Safety
December 30, 2000
C-1
Appendix C
REFERENCES
FAA System Safety Handbook, Appendix C: Related Readings in Aviation System Safety
December 30, 2000
C-2
GOVERNMENT REFERENCES
FAA Order 1810, Acquisition Policy
FAA Order 8040.4 FAA Safety Risk Management
FAA Advisory Circular 25.1309 (Draft), System Design and Analysis, January 28, 1998
RTCA-DO 178B, Software Considerations In Airborne Systems And Equipment Certification,
December 1, 1992 COMDTINST M411502D, System Acquisition Manual, December 27,
1994DODD 5000.1, Defense Acquisition, March 15, 1996
DOD 5000.2R, Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs and Major
Automated Information Systems, March 15, 1996
DOD-STD 2167A, Military Standard Defense System Software Development, February 29, 1988
MIL-STD 882D, System Safety Program Requirements, February 10, 2000
MIL-STD 498, Software Development and Documentation, December 5, 1994
MIL-HDBK-217A, “Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment,” 1982.
MIL-STD-1629A “Procedures for Performing a Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis,”
November 1980.
MIL-STD-1472D, “Human Engineering Design Criteria for Military Systems, Equipment and
Facilities,” 14 March 1989.
NSS 1740.13, Interim Software Safety Standard, June 1994
29 CFR 1910.119 Process Safety Management, U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1992.
Department of the Air Force, Software Technology Support Center, Guidelines for Successful
Acquisition and Management of Software-Intensive Systems: Weapon Systems, Command and
Control Systems, Management Information Systems, Version-2, June 1996, Volumes 1 and 2
AFISC SSH 1-1, Software System Safety Handbook, September 5, 1985
Department of Defense, AF Inspections and Safety Center (now the AF Safety Agency), AFIC
SSH 1-1 “Software System Safety,” September 1985.
Department of Labor, 29 CFR 1910, “OSHA Regulations for General Industry,” July 1992.
Department of Labor, 29 CFR 1910.119, “Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous
Chemicals,” Federal Register, 24 February 1992.
Department of Labor, 29 CFR 1926, “OSHA Regulations for Construction Industry,” July 1992.
　
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