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that maintains a risk level acceptable to the MA.
• Consideration is given to safety, ease of disposal, and storage of any hazardous materials
associated with the system.
• Significant safety data are documented as "lessons learned" and are submitted to data banks,
design handbooks, or specifications.
• Hazards identified after production are minimized consistent with program restraints.
System Safety
Order of
Precedence.
The overall goal of a system safety program is to design systems that do not contain
unacceptable hazards. However, the nature of most complex systems makes it impossible or
impractical to design them completely hazard-free. As hazard analyses are performed, hazards
will be identified that require resolution. System safety precedence defines the order to be
followed for satisfying system safety requirements and reducing the presence and impact of
risks. The alternatives for eliminating the specific hazard or controlling its associated risk must
be evaluated so that an acceptable method for risk reduction can be pursued.
FAA System Safety Handbook, Appendix A: Glossary
December 30, 2000
A -17
CONCEPT or
TERM
DESCRIPTION
Design for Minimum Risk. The most effective safety program is one that eliminates hazards
through design. If an identified hazard cannot be eliminated, reduce the associated risk to an
acceptable level, as defined by the MA, through design selection. Defining minimum risk is not
a simple matter. It is not a cookbook process that can be numerically developed without
considerable thought. Minimum risk varies from program to program. See paragraph 3.6 for
more information.
Incorporate Safety Devices. If identified hazards cannot be eliminated or their associated risk
adequately reduced through design selection, that risk should be reduced to a level acceptable to
the MA through the use of fixed, automatic, or other protective safety design features or
devices. Provisions should be made for periodic functional checks of safety devices when
applicable.
Provide Warning Devices. When neither design nor safety devices can effectively eliminate
identified hazards or adequately reduce associated risk, devices should be used to detect the
condition and to produce an adequate warning signal to alert personnel of the hazard. Warning
signals and their application must be designed to minimize the probability of incorrect
personnel reaction to the signals and shall be standardized within like types of systems.
Develop Procedures and Training. Where it is impractical to eliminate hazards through design
selection or adequately reduce the associated risk with safety and warning devices, procedures
and training should be used. However, without a specific waiver from the MA, no warning,
caution, or other form of written advisory shall be used as the only risk reduction method for
Category I or II hazards. Procedures may include the use of personal protective equipment.
System Safety
Program
The tasks and activities of system safety that enhance effectiveness by ensuring that
requirements are met, in a timely, cost-effective manner throughout all phases of the system life
cycle.
System Safety
Program Plan
A description of the planned methods to be used to implement the system safety requirements.
System Safety
Requirements
by Acquisition
Phase
Concept Exploration
• Evaluate system safety design features
• Identify possible interface problems
• Highlight special safety considerations
• Describe safety tests/data needed for next phase
• Update requirements based on analysis results
• Review designs of similar systems
• Use past experience with similar system requirements
• Identify waiver requirements
• Prepare a report for milestone reviews
• Tailor subsequent phase SSPs.
FAA System Safety Handbook, Appendix A: Glossary
December 30, 2000
A -18
CONCEPT or
TERM
DESCRIPTION
Demonstration/Validation
• SSPP describing contractor's proposed safety program effort
• Establish criteria for validating contractor performance
• Update specifications, requirements, safety characteristics
• PHA for hazards and inherent risks
• Safety Interface study for subsystems, e.g., Subsystem Hazard Analysis (SSHA)
• Trade-off studies
• Identify risks from design, operating environment, and technology
• Identify qualification/quantitative system safety requirements
• Perform system and equipment interface analyses e.g., System Hazard Analysis (SHA)
and Operating and Support Hazard Analysis (O&SHA)
　
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