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f) the ability to relate to all levels, both inside and outside the organization;
15-APP 1-2 Safety Management Manual (SMM)
g) organizational ability;
h) capable of working unsupervised;
i) good analytical skills;
j) leadership skills and an authoritative approach; and
k) worthy of respect among peers and management.
Authority
7. Regarding safety matters, the SM has direct access to the CEO and appropriate management.
8. The SM is authorized to conduct safety audits of any aspect of the operation.
9. The SM has the authority to convene an inquiry into an accident or incident in accordance with the
procedures specified in the safety management manual.
16-1
Chapter 16
AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS
16.1 GENERAL
16.1.1 Annex 6 — Operation of Aircraft, Part I — International Commercial Air Transport —
Aeroplanes, and Part III — International Operations — Helicopters, requires States to establish a safety
programme in order to achieve an acceptable level of safety in the operation of aircraft. As part of their
safety programme, States require operators to implement an accepted safety management system (SMS).
16.1.2 An SMS allows operators to integrate their diverse safety activities into a coherent system.
Examples of safety activities that might be integrated into an operator’s SMS include:
a) hazard and incident reporting;
b) Flight Data Analysis (FDA);
c) Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA); and
d) cabin safety.
Each is described more fully below.
16.2 HAZARD AND INCIDENT REPORTING
16.2.1 The principles and operation of successful incident reporting systems are discussed in
Chapter 7. There are few better examples of an organization’s commitment to safety and its fostering of a
positive safety culture than the implementation of a non-punitive incident reporting system. Nowadays, many
operators have made this commitment to safety and, as a result, benefited not only from improved hazard
identification but also from improved efficiencies in flight operations.
Benefits
16.2.2 Incident reporting systems are one of an operator’s most effective tools for proactive hazard
identification, a key element of effective safety management. Policies, procedures and practices developed
within an organization sometimes introduce unforeseen hazards into aircraft operations. These latent
conditions (hazards) may lie dormant for years. They are usually introduced unknowingly, often with the best
of intentions. Examples include poor equipment design, inappropriate management decisions, ambiguously
written procedures and inadequate communication between management and line personnel. Line
management can also introduce such hazards by instituting operating procedures that do not work as
intended under “real world” conditions. In short, hazards may have their origins far removed in space and
time from the incidents that may eventually result from them.
16-2 Safety Management Manual (SMM)
16.2.3 An accident or incident may not result from these hazards immediately because “front-line
personnel” (whether they be pilots, ATCOs or AMEs) often develop ways of coping with the hazard —
sometimes described as “work arounds”. However, if the hazards are not identified and addressed, sooner
or later the coping mechanisms fail and an accident or incident ensues.
16.2.4 A properly managed in-house reporting system can help companies identify many of these
hazards. By collecting, aggregating and then analysing hazard and incident reports, safety managers can
better understand problems encountered during operations. Armed with this knowledge, they can initiate
systemic solutions, rather than short-term fixes that may only hide the real problems.
Encouraging the free flow of safety information
16.2.5 The trust of employees in the incident reporting system is fundamental to the quality, accuracy
and substance of data reported. If hazard and incident data are collected in a corporate atmosphere where
employees feel free to openly share safety information, the data will contain much useful detail. Since it will
represent the actual environment, it will be helpful in determining contributing factors and areas of safety
concern.
16.2.6 On the other hand, if the company uses incident reports for disciplinary purposes, the company
incident reporting system will only receive the minimum information required to comply with company rules.
Little useful information from a safety perspective could be expected.
16.2.7 The trust necessary for the free flow of safety information is very fragile. It may take years to
establish; yet, one breach of that trust may undermine the effectiveness of the system for a long time.
　
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