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guidelines – Signing for Work Performance / FZE / B1 Airbus /A 320 / all ATA electronical, avionics,
Certification of Aircraft and Aircraft Components – Issue of CRS / FZE / B1 / Airbus / A 320.
1.6 Aircraft information
The aeroplane concerned is an Airbus A 320-200, manufactured in 1990.
The aeroplane is equipped with a fly-by-wire system, i.e. all control surfaces (elevator, stabilizer,
ailerons and spoilers) except for the rudder are controlled electrically by means of an hydraulic actuator.
The hydraulic actuators for the rudder are controlled mechanically. In addition there is a mechanical
back-up system for the rudder and the stabilizer. 7 computers are provided for the primary
control of the aeroplane:
• 2 elevator aileron computers (ELAC) for the elevator and aileron control as well as the control of
the SECs to control the spoilers (global roll computation)
• 3 spoiler elevator computers (SEC) to control the spoilers and as standby system for the elevator
and stabilizer control
• 2 flight augmentation computers (FAC) to stabilize the aeroplane flight attitude, e.g. damping of
the Dutch Roll effect in flight, support of the roll control by turn coordination, rudder trim coordination
in case of engine failure and adoption of rudder travel function depending on speed
Two side sticks in the cockpit, which are not mechanically linked with each other allow manual control
inputs by the crew. The movements of the sidesticks are transformed into electrical signals and are
transmitted to the corresponding computers. Generally the sidestick being moved out of its neutral
BFU German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Investigation
5X004-0/01 10
position has priority. If both sidesticks are moved simultaneously, the signals of both sidesticks are
added up with the resulting signal being limited by the maximum travel of one individual sidestick.
If one pilot wishes to take over control he will have to press the "TAKE OVER PUSH BUTTON" on his
sidestick. If he releases the button within 30 seconds, both sidesticks are equal in priority again and
the control signals of both sidesticks will be added up again. If he holds the push button pressed for
more than 30 seconds, his sidestick gets priority and at the same time a green light will light up on the
instrument panel in front of him whereas on the other side a red light will light up. This priority can be
neutralized only by pressing the "TAKE OVER PUSH BUTTON" on the other side.
1.6.1 Case History
Already on 17 March 2001 in Hamburg, ELAC no. 2 failed and was then replaced by a new one. All
tests conducted afterwards showed a proper function.
A second error message of the ELAC no. 2 appeared on 18 March 2001 at Frankfurt during taxiing. By
briefly pulling the circuit breakers of the ELAC no. 2 the crew made a “RESET“ after which no further
error message appeared.
A further error message of ELAC no. 2 appeared in the evening of 18 March 2001 at Moscow Airport,
when the powerplants were started. The aeroplane was parked again and engine shut down. As a
corrective action ELAC no. 1 and ELAC no. 2 were interchanged. The defect, however, persisted on
position 2. Therefore the corresponding circuit breakers were pulled pursuant to the "OPERATIONAL
MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE" (OMP) and in accordance with the "MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST"
(MEL) so that the defect was now on position 1. The return flight was conducted in accordance with
the MEL with a functioning ELAC no. 2.
The complaint was entered by the crew into the "TECHNICAL LOGBOOK". At the same day, on
18.03.2001, the aeroplane was delivered to the maintenance organisation in Frankfurt.
1.6.2 Repair
When the aeroplane was taken over from flight operations, the complaint “failure of the ELAC no. 2“,
which the crew had entered into the aeroplane’s Technical Logbook, was erroneously transferred by a
maintenance staff member under an incorrect number into the "GROUND LOGBOOK"(GLB).
During the error search, which was accomplished during the night shift from 18th to 19th March 2001 a
defect in the X-TALK-BUS between ELAC no. 1 and ELAC no. 2 could be localized. It was caused by
a bent connection pin (Pin 6K) in the plug segment AE of the socket for the ELAC no. 1.
The attempt to replace the connection pin without replacing the whole plug segment was not successful.
A safety spring of the connector pin had come out and could not be inserted again. Therefore it
was decided to replace the plug segment AE, but there was a problem, it was no suitable spare plug
segment for this series of airplane on stock. Consequently it was decided to replace all four plug
　
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