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Hong Kong as the weather forecast showed that the centre of the
Tropical Depression ‘Koni’ was moving northwest towards the
planned track of Route M754. Upper cloud, turbulence and
weather deviations could therefore be expected.
2.9.2. The departure and climb out from Kota Kinabalu were normal and
the FSBS were cycled to signal to the cabin crew that cabin
services may commence, although the CP kept the cabin crew
seated for a few more minutes due to light turbulence at the time.
Witness statements from the pilots, cabin crew and passengers
were consistent with regard to the FSBS being ON when the severe
turbulence was encountered. According to the cabin crew, when
the FSBS were turned ON about 10 to 15 minutes prior to the
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accident, they had, in accordance with company procedures,
conducted a check on the passenger seat belts and stopped serving
hot drinks, before continuing with the meal service. The facts that
the passengers were seated with their seat belts fastened and that
none of the passengers sustained any serious injuries were
consistent with witness evidence that the FSBS were ON before the
turbulence encounter.
2.9.3. The aircraft is equipped with QAR which records, amongst other
data, the exact time when the FSBS is selected “ON” or “OFF”.
Had QAR data been available (Para. 1.11.3 and Para. 2.11.2 refer),
it would have been possible to clearly identify the actual time of
activation and deactivation of the FSBS.
2.10. ATC and Emergency Services
2.10.1. The accident took place within the Manila FIR when the aircraft
was under the jurisdiction of Manila ATC. The request from
HDA060 for a 10 NM deviation right of track was promptly
approved. Satisfactory two-way communication was established
between Manila ATC and the aircraft, except that when HDA060
reported the turbulence encounter to Manila ATC, the radio
transmission was garbled and was apparently not picked up by the
controller. However, this had no bearing on the outcome of the
event.
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2.10.2. On entering Hong Kong FIR at 0559, HDA060 was offered priority
landing at Hong Kong International Airport in accordance with
normal ATC practice. Suitable priority was also given for its
ground taxi into the parking bay.
2.10.3. Handling of the flight by both Manila and Hong Kong ATC was in
order. Emergency units were alerted in a timely manner and
adequate resources were provided to transport the injured persons
to hospitals.
2.11. Quick Access Recorder
2.11.1. Unlike the DFDR, which uses solid-state memory, the QAR
incorporates components with moving parts and are thus sensitive
to shock and heat. Its performance is also dependent upon the
quality of the MO disk being used.
2.11.2. The MO disk installed on HDA060 was of 128 MB capacity and
was 20% full at the time when it was removed from the aircraft
after landing. When attempting to download the QAR data for the
Hong Kong - Kota Kinabalu - Hong Kong sectors on 18 July 2003,
no data could be retrieved. The only data available on the MO disk
were those of the sectors flown on the previous day. However,
there was no defect reported on either the QAR system or the MO
disk after the accident. In the absence of records from the QAR,
the investigation team was therefore unable to cross check the data
between the DFDR and those of the QAR. Hence, only the DFDR
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data was used to obtain the parameters for reconstruction of the
flight profile. Apart from the lack of cross-reference between the
QAR and DFDR data, the absence of QAR data did not affect the
investigation as most of the required information was available
from the DFDR.
2.11.3. According to the operator, on average, QAR data was recorded
successfully on only 80% of flights and it happened that no data
could be retrieved from the QAR unit on this occasion. Although
equipage of QAR is not a regulatory requirement, from a technical
point of view, such a reliability level is considered less than
satisfactory.
2.12. Cockpit Voice Recorder
2.12.1. Most A330 aircraft operated by Hong Kong Dragon Airlines are
fitted with CVR that retain the last 2 hours of recording. However,
some aircraft are still equipped with CVR that retain only the last
30 minutes of recording. As the CVR fitted to B-HYA had a
recording capacity of 30 minutes, voice communication between
the PIC and the Co-pilot in the cockpit and the PA broadcast made
at around the time of the accident had already been over-written by
the time the aircraft landed at 0637 i.e. 1 hour and 27 minutes after
the turbulence encounter. On completion of the flight, the voice
　
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